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ABSTRACT—This article explores the anomalous ways in which copyright
owners may control use of works they publicly display. Treatment of rights
associated with publicly displayed sculpture and architecture are
dramatically different. The copyright statute deprives owners of copyrights
in constructed buildings of the ability to police the ways in which imagery
or other uses of the publicly visible structure may be exploited by others.
This article focuses on three related but different settings involving the
public display of (1) a work of graffiti, (2) a large-scale sculpture, and (3) a
building with sculptural features. Through an analysis of the differences in
their treatment, this article investigates problems in extant law and suggests
potential resolutions of the issues.
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INTRODUCTION
The right of copyright owners to control use of their publicly
displayed work is not a rational construct. Similarly, the copyright code’s
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definitions of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works on the one hand, and
architectural works on the other, defy logic. Different statutory standards
govern the way publicly visible aspects of both pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works on the one hand and architectural works on the other may
be protected, fairly used, or commercially exploited. Copyright owners of
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works control the use of their publicly
displayed works, with an important exception allowing a work to be
displayed by its owner at the place where it normally is housed.1 Control
over use of architecture routinely visible to the public, however, is
nonexistent. The copyright owner’s management of rights in a constructed
architectural work visible in a public place was limited when the
architecture provisions were added to the code in 1990.2 Anomalous
distinctions in the ways publicly displayed works may be used are
exacerbated by the quite different statutory definitions of pictorial, graphic,

1

The exclusive rights of a copyright holder are described in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2017):

Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission.
Permission to display where the work is located is granted by 17 U.S.C. § 109(c).
2 Architectural Works Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990). The act
declined to grant display rights to architecture by adding the following section to the code.
17 U.S.C. § 120 - Scope of exclusive rights in architectural works
(a) PICTORIAL REPRESENTATIONS PERMITTED.—
The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does not include the right to
prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or
other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is
located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.
(b) ALTERATIONS TO AND DESTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS.—
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(2), the owners of a building embodying an
architectural work may, without the consent of the author or copyright owner of the
architectural work, make or authorize the making of alterations to such building, and destroy
or authorize the destruction of such building.
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and sculptural creations and architectural works.3 These two sets of
differences—management of publicly displayed works and definitional
norms—lead to judicial resolutions of similar disputes in illogical and
incoherent ways. This essay explores these problems, first by discussing
situations in which similar uses of different types of copyrightable works
were incompatibly resolved, and then by suggesting some solutions for
these ongoing problems.
I.

STORIES AND THEIR COPYRIGHT CONSEQUENCES

Three stories demonstrate the scope of these problems—two involving
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works and the other regarding a
construction project that may have been an amalgam of different types of
work. The first two involve the non-permissive use of illegal graffiti or
street art in an advertising campaign and the hotly contested use of a
sculptural work in political ways the artist found totally unacceptable. The
final story reviews a controversy over the use of a large scale outdoor
architectural, or perhaps sculptural, urban landscape as a backdrop for a
fantasy super-hero film.
A. Pictorial, Graphic and Sculptural Works
1. Street Art and the Public Display Rights of Illegally Made Works
A series of controversies have arisen in the last twenty years over the
use of street art by various businesses in advertising campaigns and other
publicity efforts.4 Perhaps the most widely known and interesting is the
3 The differences arise in part because of the definitions of architectural works on the one hand, and
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works on the other. Both are defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101:

An “architectural work” is the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium
of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the
overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design,
but does not include individual standard features.
....
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include two-dimensional and threedimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions,
maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans.
Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this
section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.
4 See Jim Armitage, Corporate Vandalism? Anger as brands ‘steal’ street art for ads, THE
EVENING STANDARD (May 3, 2017, 12:15PM), https://www.standard.co.uk/business/corporatevandalism-anger-as-brands-steal-street-art-for-ads-a3529681.html
[https://perma.cc/R722-F29C]
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2018 controversy between Jason “REVOK” Williams, a Los Angeles-based
street artist, and H&M Clothing.5 Williams created the graffiti piece
pictured below on a handball court at the William Sheridan playground in
gentrifying Williamsburg, Brooklyn.

(detailing controversy between British Air and a group of artists including widely known German artist
Claudia “MadC” Walde, Argentinian Elian Chali, and Puerto Rican Alexis Diaz); Alex Braverman,
Fair Use Fashion? Or Stolen Street Art?: Examining Copyright Protection for Graffiti through Katy
Perry’s Moschino Gown, WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. BLOG (Nov. 17, 2015),
http://ipjournal.law.wfu.edu/2015/11/fair-use-fashion-or-stolen-street-art-examining-copyrightprotection-for-graffiti-through-katy-perrys-moschino-gown/ [https://perma.cc/M8FK-2924] (describing
a controversy caused by a dress created by fashion designer Moschino and worn by Katy Perry); Eileen
Kinsella, ‘Livid’ Graffiti Artists Sue Fashion Label Vince Camuto for Using Their Artwork in Ads,
ARTNET NEWS (July 11, 2017) https://news.artnet.com/art-world/graffiti-artists-sue-vince-camuto1019147 [https://perma.cc/C4FX-Q3ZX] (describing suit filed by four Brooklyn artists — Joseph
“Rime” Tierney, Cary “Host18” Patraglia, Spencer “Taboo” Valdez, and Keith “Reme” Rowland,
against fashion brand Vince Camuto for unauthorized use of work in advertisements); Benjamin Sutton,
How Graffiti Artists Are Fighting Back against Brands That Steal Their Work, ARTSY (Aug. 3, 2018,
8:30AM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-graffiti-artists-fighting-brands-steal-work (last
visited Aug. 2, 2019) (describing challenge brought by Swiss artist Adrian “Smash 137” Faulkner
against General Motors for the use of his work); Alan Feuer, G.M. Used Graffiti in a Car Ad. Should
the Artist Be Paid?, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/17/arts/design
/general-motors-graffiti-artist-copyright.html [https://perma.cc/3SEF-H8GF] (same). See also Luma
Zayad, Tagged: Graffiti’s Advancements in Mainstream Culture through Expanded Copyright
Protection in Williams v. Cavalli, 26 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 161 (2016)
(summarizing a series of older disputes).
5 See Alan Feuer, Brooklyn Lawsuit Asks if Illegal Graffiti Is Protected by Copyright Law, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/nyregion/brooklyn-graffiti-hmlawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/FN3P-YL5L].
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FIG. 1: HANDBALL COURT GRAFFITI CREATED BY JASON “REVOK”
WILLIAMS6

He made it by creating a rig holding eight spray paint cans which
simultaneously marked a wall when pressed against the surface.7 The New
York City Department of Parks and Recreation claimed the piece was
illegal—an act of vandalism and damage to city property that was later
painted over by public authorities.8

6 Brooklyn
Street Art, Revok sued by H&M, I LOVE GRAFFITI (2018),
https://ilovegraffiti.de/blog/2018/03/15/revok-sued-by-hm/ [https://perma.cc/FE7T-QBH3].
7 A brief video of the method is embedded in Keith Estiler, UPDATE: H&M Files Lawsuit Against
Graffiti Artist, Denies Copyright Protection, HYPEBEAST (Mar. 16, 2018), https://hypebeast.com/2018/3
/hm-revok-copyright-infringement-case [https://perma.cc/L5NM-FDWY]. For more details about
REVOK and his style, see Library Street Collective, Jason Revok, Systems, LSC GALLERY (2016),
http://www.lscgallery.com/jason-revok-systems/ [https://perma.cc/EMP8-UCCJ].
8 Complaint at 4, H&M Hennes & Mauritz GBC AB et al. v. Williams, No. 1:18-cv-01490
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2018)
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Before the work was removed, H&M developed a “New Routine”
advertising campaign for some of its sportwear prominently using
William’s work as a backdrop for an acrobatic, gymnast like “dance.”9
FIG. 2: IMAGE FROM H&M “NEW ROUTINE” ADVERTISEMENT10

Jeff Gluck, Williams’ lawyer, sent H&M a cease and desist letter
protesting the violation of copyright laws.11 The company’s response was to
file suit against Williams seeking a declaratory judgment that he could not

9 For a portion of the video see David Ashworth, H&M’s Scandelous “New Routine” Sportswear
Campaign, YOUTUBE (Mar. 16, 2018)., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABhJuyAf3eI
[https://perma.cc/NM7U-EGD5].
10 Complaint, Exh. C at 8, H&M Hennes & Mauritz GBC AB, No. 1:18-cv-01490.
11 Complaint at 8, H&M Hennes & Mauritz GBC AB, No. 1:18-cv-01490.
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hold a copyright in illegally painted graffiti works.12 In its complaint, H&M
claimed that “Williams has no copyright rights to assert because his Graffiti
was created through criminal conduct” and that “federal copyright
protection is a privilege that does not extend to illegally created works.”13
The story’s denouement was fast and embarrassing for H&M. Graffiti,
hip-hop, and other artists complained bitterly that H&M’s legal position
was culturally and legally untenable; they initiated an online movement to
boycott the company that quickly gathered steam.14 Within a short time,
H&M stepped back from the brink, voluntarily dismissed its case, and later
settled the dispute not only by agreeing to remove Williams’s work from its
ads, but also by contributing funds to various Detroit arts organizations in
settlement of Williams’s copyright claims.15 The outcome of the dispute is
one of many examples confirming the growing market power and widening
aesthetic appeal of street art. H&M had the misfortune not only to use the
work of a widely known and important artist,16 but also to make its ad just
as the legal and cultural power of the graffiti community was rapidly
growing. Advertisers using graffiti in their campaigns now routinely cave
when challenged.17 And the stunning $6.75 million damage award in the
long and tumultuous 5Pointz moral rights litigation18 sent a definitive
warning to businesses that their assumptions about the free and easy ability
12

Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
14 This was by no means the first time H&M found itself in hot water over an advertising
campaign. A short time before the REVOK controversy, the company ran an ad with a picture of a
black child wearing a sweat shirt with the phrase “Coolest Monkey in the Jungle.” Needless to say, the
uproar was immediate and overwhelming. The company quickly apologized. Liam Stack, H&M
Apologizes for ‘Monkey’ Image Featuring Black Child, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/business/hm-monkey.html [https://perma.cc/Z4SR-KGFB].
15 Henri Neuendorf, Street Artist Revok and H&M Settle Dispute Over an Ad That Featured His
Work Without Permission, ARTNET NEWS (Sep, 7, 2018), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/revok-hmad-campaign-1345127 [https://perma.cc/A9NB-2JCV].
16 Roger Gastman, the most important and knowledgeable chronicler of American graffiti, has
published an important work on REVOK, CALEB NEELON, MATTHEW EATON, AND ROGER GASTMAN,
REVOK (2014) and also curated a major display of his work in 2013 at the Jonathan Levine Gallery in
Chelsea, New York City. Pose and Revok: Uphill Both Ways, JONATHAN LEVINE PROJECTS (June 29,
2013)
https://jonathanlevineprojects.com/exhibits/pose-and-revokuphill-both-ways/
[https://perma.cc/9AQU-XWS4]. REVOK’s work also was in a major show at the Los Angeles
Museum of Contemporary Art in 2011, curated by Gastman and others. Art in the Streets at the MOCA,
ARTE FUSE (April 20, 2011), https://artefuse.com/2011/04/20/art-in-the-streets-at-the-moca/
[https://perma.cc/66YL-YFMB].
17 See the articles, supra note 4.
18 See Richard Chused, Moral Right: The Anti-Rebellion Graffiti Heritage of 5Pointz, 41 COLUM. J.
L. & ARTS 583 (2018). The case recently was argued in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See
Amanda Ottaway, Graffiti-Whitewash Appeal Lands With Thud at 2nd Circuit, COURTHOUSE NEWS
(Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/graffiti-whitewash-appeal-lands-with-thud-at-2ndcircuit/ [https://perma.cc/XV6U-56UR].
13
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to use street art as they pleased without legal consequences were simply
wrong. These cultural shifts in attitude about street art were given room to
flower by two critically important aspects of copyright law—the
protectability of original works of expression even if they are made in
violation of non-copyright legal norms and the scope of control by owners
of copyrights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works over the way others
may use the works when they are publicly displayed.
a. Legality of Graffiti
Though there is some literature suggesting that illegal graffiti is not
copyrightable,19 those “illegality” arguments are of dubious validity. Illegal
work is not barred from protection. The United States Supreme Court has
not directly spoken on the issue but has vigorously eschewed making
content judgments in determining whether a work is protectable.20 The
copyright statute makes that legal strand sensible. For even if a work’s
creation or publication violates a non-copyright norm, nothing in the
copyright statute bars criminal or civil prosecution for the illegal activity
while still affirming the validity of any copyrights. For example,
defamation claims may be pursued against authors and trespass charges
may be brought against graffiti artists. Parties may force defamatory works
to be withdrawn from the market and illegal graffiti to be taken down.
Those obtaining judgments in such cases from writers or painters may levy
on any profits gained from intellectual property royalties or art sales. But
the copyrights themselves are not affected; they continue to exist. Someone
reprinting a defamatory book may be subject to two law suits—one by the
author of the book and the other by the person defamed.
19 See, e.g., Sara Cloon, Incentivizing Graffiti: Extending Copyright Protection to a Prominent
Artistic Movement, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 54, 65–68 (2017); Celia Lerman, Protecting
Artistic Vandalism: Graffiti and Copyright Law, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 295, 316 (2013).
20 Marc J. Randazza, Freedom of Expression and Morality-Based Impediments to the Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights, 16 NEV. L.J. 107, 133 (2015). The classic statement about the duty of
courts to eschew aesthetic quality judgments was made by Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903). In a case about the copyrightability of circus
advertising posters, he wrote:

It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very
novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their
author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the
paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other
end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the
judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value—it would
be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value—and the taste of any public
is not to be treated with contempt.
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The basic rule long has been that to be available for copyright
protection a work simply must be “original” and “fixed” in a tangible
medium of expression. The originality requirement is hardly stringent.
Some small exercise of human creativity in the formation of a work is
usually sufficient. Compose a mostly trite, bad poem and pat yourself on
the back for producing a copyrighted work. While the fixation requirement
mandates that a work be “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration,”21 that standard does not embody any idea of
permanence. The expectation that a work of graffiti will be erased or
painted over at some point in the future does not mean that its visibility is
transitory and therefore not protectable. Holdings that materials stored in
computer memory for short periods are “fixed” under the copyright statute
make that quite clear.22 In short, the works of REVOK were copyrighted,
illegal or not.
b.
Control Over Use of Public Displays
The most important aspects of copyright law for purposes of the
REVOK dispute are the exclusive rights of the owner of a copyright in a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work to “display the copyrighted work
publicly,” and to prevent further use of that work once it is visible to the
public.23 While the owner of a particular tangible copy of a work has the
right to display that copy in the place where it is located,24 others do not
have the right to make their own copies, to display copies in other
locations, or to publish copies in various media. The simplest example is
provided by a painting hanging on a museum wall. When the artist sells
that work, she retains the copyright interest in the absence of a written
contract specifically transferring all of, or an exclusive right in, the
intellectual property rights.25 Ownership rights in the physical object
embodying the artistic expression, however, pass to the buyer of the piece;
physical property rights in a copy of an expressive work are held by the
owner of the object. That is treated as a separate bundle of interests from
the intellectual rights.26 Strangers to both the property and intellectual rights
in the painting, however, have no automatic right to use either one.
21

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
It makes no difference that street art often is temporary. Short term visibility is enough. Indeed,
in the process of discussing modern transitory art installations, some have even argued that the
limitation to “transitory” should be eliminated. See Megan M. Carpenter, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Fixing
Fixation, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355 (2016).
23 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2002).
24 Id. § 109(c).
25 Id. § 204.
26 Id. § 202.
22
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Despite the general conclusion that graffiti is copyrightable even when
illegally crafted, the very odd wording of the copyright statute’s provisions
on the public display right evokes complexities. Since copyright in such
work is clearly held by the artist unless specifically conveyed to a buyer,
REVOK held the public display interest in his street art. The work’s
illegality was irrelevant. Property rights in the physical attributes of the
work, however, are a bit less straightforward. If the work had been made
with permission of the owner of a building, the copy of the work on the
structure was owned by the party with title to the property, but the display
right was both held by the artist and protected by the Visual Artists Rights
Act’s moral right provisions limiting the building owner’s right to copy,
mutilate, distort, or destroy the work.27 Normally works of visual art not in,
or made part of, a building may not be mutilated if that action would harm
the reputation of the artist or destroyed if the work was of recognized
stature. But in the case of a work in or made part of a building with
permission, the owner may in some cases mutilate or destroy a work, if
notice is given to the artist ninety days before action is taken or if the artist

27

The full text of the statute on this point is in 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)-(2):
(1) In a case in which—
(A) a work of visual art has been incorporated in or made part of a building in such a way
that removing the work from the building will cause the destruction, distortion, mutilation,
or other modification of the work as described in section 106A(a)(3), and
(B) the author consented to the installation of the work in the building either before the
effective date set forth in section 610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, or in a
written instrument executed on or after such effective date that is signed by the owner of the
building and the author and that specifies that installation of the work may subject the work
to destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification, by reason of its removal,
then the rights conferred by paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A(a) shall not apply.

(2) If the owner of a building wishes to remove a work of visual art which is a part of such
building and which can be removed from the building without the destruction, distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of the work as described in section 106A(a)(3), the author’s
rights under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A(a) shall apply unless—
(A) the owner has made a diligent, good faith attempt without success to notify the author of
the owner’s intended action affecting the work of visual art, or
(B) the owner did provide such notice in writing and the person so notified failed, within 90
days after receiving such notice, either to remove the work or to pay for its removal.
For purposes of subparagraph (A), an owner shall be presumed to have made a diligent, good
faith attempt to send notice if the owner sent such notice by registered mail to the author at the
most recent address of the author that was recorded with the Register of Copyrights pursuant to
paragraph (3). If the work is removed at the expense of the author, title to that copy of the work
shall be deemed to be in the author.
The references in this section to §§ 106A(a)(2) and (3) refer to the rights of authors to limit mutilation,
distortion, or destruction of a work.
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agrees contractually to waive moral rights.28 There is, therefore, a split in
the rights of a building owner and an artist when the creative work is made
with permission.
As a result, fascinating conflicts between the owners of intellectual
and physical property rights may arise. The recent 5Pointz dispute is a
prime example.29 The works of street art in the complex were made with
permission, but the building owners failed to obey the copyright statute
when they white washed the compositions before demolishing the
structures in anticipation of redeveloping the site.30 On the other hand,
when the graffiti is installed illegally or without the permission of the
owner of the building, the physical rights of the building owner take
precedence if the graffiti is deemed undesirable.31 The statute only protects
display rights and moral rights for “works in or made part of a building”
when they are created with permission.32 Not surprisingly, therefore, the
building owner has the right to remove from view a piece put up without
permission—to, in short, terminate the public display right.33
But in the case of the REVOK work on the city-owned handball court,
the work was not placed on a building—defined by Copyright Office
regulations as something that is “humanly habitable.”34 On its face,
therefore, the statute placed the handball court artwork in the same shoes as
any other two-dimensional work of fine art, such as a traditional
composition on a canvas. While it is clear that REVOK retained the rights
to control use of his street art in commercial advertisements regardless of
whether the art was made with or without permission, the anomalous use of
the word “building” in the moral rights provisions of the copyright statute
would bar the city as owner of the handball court wall from destroying the
work if it was of “recognized stature.”35 And that result would extend to all
28

See 17 U.S.C. § 113(d).
See Chused, supra note 18. I have eschewed exegesis here on the moral right issues involved in
5Pointz because that would force me to repeat much of what is said in the 5Pointz article. Related issues
surface in the next section on sculpture and the display right.
30 Id. at 613–15.
31 Id. at 606–07.
32 Id. at 589.
33 Id. at 597. The more complex relationship between physical and intellectual rights when graffiti
is made on a building with permission of the owner plays out in 17 U.S.C. § 113(d). There actually is an
intriguing and potentially controversial anomaly in the statute. § 113(d) mentions two scenarios—one
about works placed in or on a building with permission of the owner and the other about placement
without permission. But what about work placed on something other than a “building” as in the
REVOK setting? Given the failure to craft a provision about such an event in § 113(d), the standard
provisions of § 106A, barring mutilation or destruction, would presumably apply.
34 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(b)(2) (defining a “humanly habitable structure” as one “designed for
human occupancy”).
35 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3).
29
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cases where illegal art is placed on a structure rather than a building—
regardless of whether it was painted with or without permission, legally or
illegally. If a similar creative endeavor was painted without permission on
the wall of a school, however, the city or other owner of the property could
take it down without penalty. That result seems unlikely to be well received
by courts, but the statute appears to compel it.
It would have been better if Congress had used a word like “structure”
rather than “building” in the code to define both a work of architecture and
to describe limitations on moral rights in works in or made part of a
physical location. If we assume that judges will find a way to ignore the
obvious dilemma, or to impose the same standards in structure cases that
the statute imposes in cases involving buildings, the city then had the
power to destroy the work—to effectively terminate the right to display the
work where it was painted. That right, if it existed in the city, however, did
not extend to H&M. That is what got the clothier in trouble. They had no
legal right to use the illegality of the piece or the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of its public display as a basis for claiming a right to use it in a commercial;
that all was in the hands of the city or the artist. The merchandising chain
was a stranger to the relationships surrounding both the intellectual and the
tangible property rights. Since REVOK retained control over the
intellectual display rights vis-à-vis all third parties, he could control how
the publicly displayed images were used in ways other than the handball
court wall, even if the city properly removed the graffiti.
This is an important point for all pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works. Just because someone owns the physical copy of a notable work of
art, does not mean that the owner may control how the work is displayed in
venues other than where it is normally kept, unless the owner also has
purchased one or more of the exclusive rights in the copyright.36 The
dilemmas for those owning art works, but not their copyrights, arise in a
number of intriguing arenas—even tattoos! Video game developers using
likenesses of famous athletes whose bodies are emblazoned with tattoos
have discovered much to their chagrin that they cannot rely on licenses
from the athletes to use computer likenesses that display their body art
unless they obtain a second license from the tattooists.37 Similarly,
museums and gallerists must be careful before they make posters or other
souvenirs of works they hold if the works are still protected by copyright,
and the museums or galleries have not purchased intellectual interests in
36

Copyright interests, of course, can be assigned by an artist to others. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 204.
Jason M. Bailey, Athletes Don’t Own Their Tattoos. That’s a Problem for Video Game
Developers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/style/tattoos-videogames.html [https://perma.cc/Z43Z-QVEY].
37
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the works. To this day it is not clear that all museums and galleries fully
understand the issue and cope with the legal issues in their daily activities.
2. Outdoor Sculptural Works and Use of Their Public Displays
One of the most celebrated outdoor sculptural works in the United
States is Anish Kapoor’s Cloud Gate, colloquially known as The Bean,
installed in 2006 in Millennium Park in Chicago. One commentator
described the work as follows:
As an object, Cloud Gate is undeniably seductive, at once
monumental and inviting. It is also willfully opaque. From a distance it
looks like a droplet of mercury, blown up to immense size. Up close, it
becomes clear that the droplet is arched, creating a passageway on an eastwest axis, joining the city to Millennium Park and the lake further on. The
space above this passageway has been hollowed out, creating a central
cavity, which Kapoor describes as an omphalos or navel. From outside,
Cloud Gate retains some Pop resonances—balloon, blood cell, mushroom,
donut, UFO—while never succumbing to any one of them. Within the
central cavity, though, it becomes a total environment, enveloping visitors
in a silvery canopy, and at the same time breaching the boundary between
sculpture and architecture.38

38 Jacob Mikanowski, Cloud Gate, Tilted Arc, THE POINT (2012), https://thepointmag.com/2012
/criticism/cloud-gate-tilted-arc [https://perma.cc/Q9VS-HZPC]. For another review of the work, see
also Archana, Cloud Gate, ART IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE (July 10, 2015),
https://artpublicsphere.wordpress.com/2015/07/20/cloud-gate/ [https://perma.cc/NX72-2ZCC].
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FIG. 3: ANISH KAPOOR’S CLOUD GATE39

Walking around and under Cloud Gate is a remarkable experience.
The mirrored surface reflects other-worldly views of the sky, people
wandering in the park, and surrounding buildings. Viewed from under the
work, the ambience resembles a carnival hall of mirrors.
There have been two noteworthy recent controversies about Cloud
Gate—one an intriguing spoof and the other a more emotional conflict.
Each raises important issues about controlling the use of public displays of
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. Not long ago, a spoof emerged
claiming that Kapoor had covered Cloud Gate in a light absorbing coat of
black material.

39 Millenium
Park
Art,
Architecture
&
Gardens,
CHOOSE CHICAGO (2019)
https://www.choosechicago.com/things-to-do/parks-and-outdoors/millennium-park/art-architectureand-gardens/ [https://perma.cc/7W4R-5SHE].
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FIG. 4: ANISH KAPOOR’S CLOUD GATE COVERED IN “FAUX” BLACK40

Pictures like the one above circulated supposedly showing the
sculpture coated with the pigment. The spoof emerged on April Fools’ Day
in 2016 after public controversy erupted over Kapoor purchasing patent
rights a bit earlier that year in a black pigment called Vantablack41 that
absorbs virtually all light, reflecting nothing that a human eye can detect.42
40 Credit for the satire goes to The Editors, Anish Kapoor Coats Cloud Gate in the Darkest Black
Known to Humanity, HYPERALLERGIC (Apr. 1, 2016), https://hyperallergic.com/287628/anish-kapoorcoats-cloud-gate-in-the-darkest-black-known-to-humanity/ [https://perma.cc/8CZ4-E2C7]. The photo
just above is credited to the City of Chicago, but that must either be part of the joke or a reference to the
image that the publication edited to change the color.
41 For more on the color, said at the time of its invention, to be the darkest color on earth, see
Vantablack,
SURREY
NANOSYSTEMS,
https://www.surreynanosystems.com/vantablack
[https://perma.cc/8M8C-2RRM]. It has recently been revealed that an even darker black has been
invented. Kendall Trammel, There’s New Blackest Black Material, and it Can Even Cloak This Bright
Sparkling Diamond, CNN (Sep. 18, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/style/article/mit-new-blackest-blackmaterial-scn-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/6GEZ-QG6T].
42 Commentary effectively critiqued Kapoor for seeking to control the artistic use of a pigment—a
step to which many artists vehemently objected. Kapoor purchased the patent rights from Surrey
NanoSystems in February 2016. See Brigid Delaney, “You Could Disappear Into it”: Anish Kapoor on
his Exclusive Rights to the “Blackest Black”, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 25, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/sep/26/anish-kapoor-vantablack-art-architectureexclusive-rights-to-the-blackest-black [https://perma.cc/8MNJ-2D8Q]; Benjamin Wallace, This
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Looking at it simulates peering into a visual black hole. If the interior of a
concave half-moon shape is coated with the material and you place your
face inside it so that you cannot see any of the rest of the world, you will
feel completely disoriented.43 The use of Vantablack, as in the spoof picture
above, would have totally transformed Cloud Gate. But it was, after all, a
hoax—and a good one at that.
The less humorous controversy was between Kapoor and the National
Rifle Association. The N.R.A. placed a very fleeting, momentary shot of
Cloud Gate in a nasty 2017 recruiting video variously called “The
Clenched Fist of Truth” or the “Violence of Lies.”44
FIG. 5: VIEW OF CLOUD GATE IN THE N.R.A. VIDEO45

Company Created the Blackest Black Ever Known – and Only One Artist Can Use It, N.Y. MAGAZINE
(Apr.
21,
2016),
https://www.vulture.com/2016/04/vantablack-anish-kapoor.html
[https://perma.cc/BCU4-9AVD].
43 I have had that experience with a Kapoor half-moon shape covered with a different, very dark
substance.
44 Complaint at 1, Kapoor v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., No. 1:18-cv-01320 (E.D. Va. Oct. 23,
2018).
45 Id. at 5.
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Dana Loesch narrated the piece in a deeply chilling, menacing tone.46
The shot of Cloud Gate appeared at eighteen seconds into the video and
disappeared almost immediately.47 Though it displayed a full view of the
work, its short period of visibility made it easy to miss when watching the
video.
Nonetheless, Kapoor was furious, releasing an emotional
condemnation of the N.R.A. for using an image of his work. The release, in
part, stated:
”Cloud Gate” reflects the space around it, the city of Chicago. People visit the
sculpture to get married, to meet friends, to take selfies, to dance, to jump, to
engage in communal experience. Its mirrored form is engulfing and intimate.
It gathers the viewer into itself. This experience, judging by the number of
people that visit it every day (two-hundred million to date), still seems to carry
the potential to communicate a sense of wonder. A mirror of self and other,
both private and collective, “Cloud Gate”—or the “Bean” as it often
affectionately referred to—is an inclusive work that engages public
participation. Its success has little to do with me, but rather with the thousands
of residents and visitors who have adopted it and embraced it as their “Bean”.
“Cloud Gate” has become a democratic object in a space that is free and open
to all.
In the NRA’s vile and dishonest video, “Cloud Gate” appears as part of a
montage of iconic buildings that purport to represent “Liberal America” in
which the “public object” is the focus of communal exchange. Art seeks new
form, it is by its nature a dynamic force in society. The NRA in its nationalist
rhetoric uses “Cloud Gate” to suggest that these ideas constitute a “foreign
object” in our midst. The NRA’s video gives voice to xenophobic anxiety, and
a further call to “arm” the population against a fictional enemy.
The NRA’s nightmarish, intolerant, divisive vision perverts everything that
“Cloud Gate”—and America—stands for. Art must stand clear in its mission
to recognize the dignity and humanity of all, irrespective of creed or racial
origin.48

Kapoor’s demand that the fleeting shot of Cloud Gate be removed
from the video was initially rejected.49 He then filed suit in Chicago seeking
damages for copyright infringement.50 The primary allegation was that
46 See NRATV, The Violence of Lies, THE WASHINGTON POST (June. 30, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/national/nra-ad-the-violence-of-lies/2017/06/30/295dde845d93-11e7-aa69-3964a7d55207_video.html [https://perma.cc/T2UA-RYFU].
47 Id.
48 Anish Kapoor, Open Letter on the NRA’s unauthorized use of Cloud Gate (Mar. 12, 2018),
http://anishkapoor.com/5104/letter-to-the-nra [https://perma.cc/WC8S-BMB4].
49 Complaint at 6, Kapoor, No. 1:18-cv-01320.
50 Id. at 2.

71

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

“Defendant infringed plaintiff’s copyright in CLOUD GATE by, inter alia,
filming or videotaping it, making internal copies, incorporating it into its
video ‘The Clenched Fist of Truth,’ . . . and distributing and displaying it to
the public on television and through the internet.”51 The case was later
transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia where the N.R.A. is
headquartered and settled near the end of 2018.52 The settlement simply
provided that the N.R.A. would remove the image of Cloud Gate from the
video. No money changed hands.
These two controversies over Cloud Gate open several windows into
the scope of control copyright owners retain over use of their publicly
displayed works. While the legal issues surfaced here were unlikely to
provide Kapoor with any relief, some of the them were fascinating and
intriguing, if not difficult. The nature of copyright infringement rules and
fair use are both relevant. Though REVOK obtained a favorable settlement
in his dispute with H&M, that does not negate the importance of basic and
important defenses in typical public display infringement cases—de
minimis use and fair use in the case of Cloud Gate.
a. De minimis Use
In any copyright infringement case, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant’s use was substantial. Minor or trifling violations will be
excused. A classic example in the public display arena is Gottlieb
Development LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp.53 In the Paramount movie
What Women Want, Mel Gibson played an advertising executive with the
knack of sensing the thoughts of women.54 In one scene, he and his co-star
Helen Hunt brainstormed with other employees about marketing consumer
products to women.55 During the scene, a Silver Slugger pinball machine
made by Gottlieb was displayed in the background as the camera panned
the action.56

51

Id. at 6.
Sopan Deb, N.R.A. to Pull Image of Sculpture From Its Video, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/arts/design/anish-kapoor-nra-bean.html [https://perma.cc/S7V6EXN4]. A stipulation of settlement was filed on Dec. 17, 2018.
53 590 F.Supp.2d 625 (S.D.N.Y 2008).
54 Id. at 629.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 629–30.
52
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FIG. 6: SCENE FROM WHAT WOMEN WANT WITH PINBALL MACHINE
IN THE BACKGROUND57

The court described the episode:
The three-and-a-half-minute scene depicts a brainstorming meeting in the
office of the advertising agency. The meeting takes place in a large room with
a relaxed and casual atmosphere—the room contains recliner chairs and bar
stools, and on the far wall there is a large poster board prominently displaying
the word “PLAY.” A mini basketball hoop appears on one side of the room,
and a statue of a penguin appears on the other. Approximately eight people are
sitting in a circle. Behind one woman is a table soccer-or “foosball”-game. As
Gibson’s character pitches various ideas for advertisements, the “Silver
Slugger” appears intermittently in the background, next to another pinball
machine. It appears only for seconds at a time, always in the background, and
always partially obscured by Gibson, a recliner chair, or a bar stool. The
“Silver Slugger” does not appear in any shot by itself, nor is it part of the plot.
It does not appear anywhere else in the Film, nor does any character ever refer
to it. It is simply part of the background in one limited scene.58

57
58

Id. at 628.
Id. at 630.
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The court concluded that the presence of the machine in the scene was
de minimis and therefore not a substantial infringing use.59 A similar, and
probably stronger, argument was available to the N.R.A. in its dispute with
Kapoor. The use of Kapoor’s work was for less than a second—a truly
fleeting glimpse. In addition, while Kapoor claimed that his work was used
to signify the awful characteristics of liberalism and gun control advocacy,
it is extremely difficult to glean that general message of the video as
specifically referring to Cloud Gate. Though the entire ad certainly had that
flavor, Cloud Gate was not specifically referenced as emblematic of any
particular social or political point of view. In short, it is a strong argument
maybe made that the very brief appearance of an image of Kapoor’s work
in the N.R.A. clip was de minimis.
This contrasts in interesting ways with the REVOK dispute. Though
the advertisement in which the street art appeared was quite brief (just over
ten seconds) in comparison to the three-and-a-half-minute scene in What
Women Want, the street art formed the entire background for most of the
commercial video.60 The acrobatic dancer used the wall as a prop to plant a
foot for leverage to do a somersault in midair and land with arms stretched
out and a large smile on his face.61 In short, the art was the central focus of
both the ad and its message that H&M’s “New Routine” clothing line was
designed for an energetic, athletic, young population. It played on the
notion that younger people appreciated street art and the vibrancy many of
its compositions brought to urban life. The centrality of the graffiti and its
importance in conveying a commercial message contrasted decisively with
the irrelevant, incidental, and ignored presence of the pinball game in the
background of the movie scene or the passing presence of Kapoor’s work
in the N.R.A video. De minimis use, in short, measures not merely the
length of a use but its significance in the overall display setting. It operates,
at least in these three cases, as a first cousin to fair use.
b. Fair Use
In addition to the use of Cloud Gate by the N.R.A. likely being de
minimis, the appearance of Cloud Gate in both the Vantablack spoof and
the N.R.A. video was likely protected by fair use under standards typically
applied in that realm. Vastly over-simplifying an extraordinarily messy
batch of precedents, fair use allows any of us to employ materials protected
by copyright if our new use is transformative and doesn’t negatively affect

59
60
61
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Id. at 632.
See Complaint, Exh. C at 8, H&M Hennes & Mauritz GBC AB, supra note 10.
Id. at 3–5.
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the market for the original work.62 Parody, for example, often qualifies as
fair use. It typically is not the sort of product authors will create about their
own work. And inevitably any parody must refer to a known creation and
in some way transform or mock the original work in order for it to be
successful and meaningful. This was recognized by the Supreme Court in
1994 in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.63 As the Campbell court
opined:
Parody’s humor, or in any event its comment, necessarily springs from
recognizable allusion to its object through distorted imitation. Its art lies in the
tension between a known original and its parodic twin. When parody takes
aim at a particular original work, the parody must be able to “conjure up” at
least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable.
* * * What makes for this recognition is quotation of the original’s most
distinctive or memorable features, which the parodist can be sure the audience
will know. Once enough has been taken to assure identification, how much
more is reasonable will depend, say, on the extent to which the song’s
overriding purpose and character is to parody the original or, in contrast, the
likelihood that the parody may serve as a market substitute for the original.
But using some characteristic features cannot be avoided.64

In the Vantablack setting, use of an image of Cloud Gate covered in
black was wholly appropriate. It thoroughly transformed the original
work’s visual appearance and had absolutely no impact on the economic
value of the sculpture or on Kapoor’s art marketing prowess. When placed
with tongue in cheek commentary on Kapoor’s efforts to control use of the
color Vantablack, the parody is biting, obvious, and protected. In the
explicitly labeled “Satire” column in Hyperallergic where the above
blackened image of Cloud Gate was published, the editors claimed Kapoor
was interviewed about the revamped sculpture, humorously stating:
”The public has had a decade to interact with the reflective surface of
‘Cloud Gate,’ and felt it was time for a change,” Kapoor told Hyperallergic.
“Whereas the sculpture was originally about play and surface appearance, I
think the Vantablack version is more about introspection, about becoming
disoriented, lost, and enveloped in an overwhelming void of nothingness.”65

Kapoor took no steps to contest the spoof. (Hopefully he chuckled
instead.)
62 The literature on the subject is enormous. Trying to provide a list of the best readings is a
hopeless task. Anyone looking for a workable summary might as well check out Wikipedia.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_use [https://perma.cc/LJ68-CC4R].
63 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
64 Id. at 588.
65 The Editors, supra note 40.
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The fair use issue in the N.R.A. setting also was easily resolvable
under standard analysis, though for different reasons. As noted, the fleeting
use likely eliminated any copyright claim, but would fair use operate if the
case went forward? The glimpse of Cloud Gate in the video posed
absolutely no economic risk to the value of the work. And the appearance
of the work in a political recruiting video was a type of use commonly
protected by fair use, even if the use seemed irrationally inappropriate to
the artist and copyright owner, and to much of the public. Commentary by
critics, jokes by comedians, and political controversy touch the core of
practices normally protected by fair use. They traditionally are deemed to
be an intrinsic part of the market’s operation in creative industries and
necessary to insure energetic and widespread understanding of and
discourse about the artistic community.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc.66 was a dispute similar
in many ways to Cloud Gate. In the November 1983 issue of Hustler
Magazine, the scatological ad parody critical of Moral Majority’s leader
Jerry Falwell pictured below was published. It contained a dialog about
Falwell having a sexual experience with his mother in an outhouse.67
Falwell and Moral Majority responded in part by creating a brochure
containing an image of the Hustler ad and asking Falwell’s supporters for
donations to counter the unfair Hustler critique or, as some would have it,
parody. Hustler then sued Moral Majority claiming copyright infringement.
The winning response, of course, was fair use.68 In the Hustler dispute, both
sides could claim that severely critical commentary and equally critical
retorts were protected. Fair use was given a great deal of room to operate.
The same thing probably would have happened in the Cloud Gate dispute.

66 See 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986). Jerry Falwell also sued Hustler for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and lost in the United States Supreme Court. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988).
67 796 F.2d at 1149–50.
68 Id.
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FIG. 7: THE HUSTLER PARODY AD

c. Fair Use Reconsidered
This last fair use perspective, however, if subjected to some different
analytical strictures, may be the most interesting and difficult aspect of the
77
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right to control use of publicly displayed pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works. In recent years, there have been a series of disputes about
organizations, politicians, and other controversial parties using copyrighted
work to promote their causes without seeking permission from or over the
vigorous objections of copyright owners or performers. The existence of a
strong disagreement over the social and cultural meanings of a copyrighted
work, as just noted, is typically a basis for granting a fair use claim, not an
issue raised to undermine it. Perhaps courts shy away from initiating a
destabilizing thought process that might raise concerns under the First
Amendment, but it may be time to introduce the problem into fair use
analysis. Rather than simply disregarding the relevance of such dyspepsia
by copyright owners, however, we might do well to step into the debate.
Most of these disputes have involved music, not pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works.69 Many of them have been easy to resolve as an
intellectual property matter, because the music was used in a forum or by
an organization with a blanket license to perform the music or with
permission from relevant copyright owners.70 In some of the cases
musicians or composers aggravated by the use of their work no longer held
any copyright interests in the works used.71 Their complaints arose from
social or political, not legal, concerns.72 Though some politicians stopped
using work upon request in order to avoid further public controversy,
commentators have struggled to find a theory allowing musicians to seek

69

The best summary of recent controversies may be found in Arlen W. Langvardt, Musicians,
Politicians, and The Forgotten Tort, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429 (2017).
Langvardt takes the position that use of other common doctrines, such as publicity rights or false
endorsement claims under the Lanham Act, don’t reach the nub of the problem. He suggests instead that
the old and largely forgotten common law tort of “false light publicity” would work better. It’s an
interesting theory. See also Courtney Willits, Candidates Shouldn’t “Cruz” Through Political
Campaigns: Why Asking for Permission to Use Music Is Becoming So Important on the Campaign
Trail, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 457 (2017); Elizabeth Long, Trumped by False
Endorsement: Musicians Still Might Have Intellectual Property Rights to Prohibit Politicians from
Using Their Songs Despite Copyright Licenses, 44 N. KY. L. REV. 171 (2017); Taylor L. Condit, The
Need for Songwriters’ Control: A Proposal to Prevent Unwanted Uses of Musical Compositions at
Political Rallies, 47 SW. L. REV. 207 (2017); Krista L. Cox, Pharrell Raises Copyright Claim Against
Trump’s Use of “Happy” at Campaign Rally After Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting, ABOVE THE LAW
(Nov. 1, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/11/pharrell-raises-copyright-claim-against-trumps-useof-happy-at-campaign-rally-after-pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting/
[https://perma.cc/4TCJ-CH36];
Eveline Chao, Stop Using My Song: 35 Artists Who Fought Politicians Over Their Music, ROLLING
STONE (July 8, 2015), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-lists/stop-using-my-song-35artists-who-fought-politicians-over-their-music-75611/ [https://perma.cc/84SQ-GR6D].
70 See Long, supra note 69, at 171–72.
71 See Cox, supra note 69.
72 Id.; Chao, supra note 69.
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relief even in cases where use was made with appropriate copyright
permissions.73 In such cases, fair use claims obviously are irrelevant.
In other cases, as in Cloud Gate where the artist held copyright in his
work, the difficulties in claiming use was unfair were compounded by the
now well-known Constitutional limitations on using legal norms to control
highly critical or inflammatory commentary about a public person,
organization, or artistic endeavor. After New York Times v. Sullivan74 and
Time, Inc. v. Hill,75 publicly important personalities must demonstrate that
use of allegedly defamatory statements or false light publicity must be
undertaken with malice.76 Some might argue that a similar constraint must
be imposed on any effort to limit fair use provisions in the Copyright Act in
ways allowing artists to constrain grossly inappropriate displays that distort
the meaning of a publicly displayed work of visual art in offensive political
or cultural ways.
The theory in such a case would be that a video like that made by the
N.R.A. would dramatically distort the meaning and creative content of
Cloud Gate—suggesting in unwarranted ways either that the artist creating
it supported the N.R.A.’s position or that the sculpture’s existence was
emblematic of America’s moral and political decay. In this setting, such
imagery might, under a revised fair use theory,77 be inappropriate under the
73

Langvardt, supra note 69.

74

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
385 U.S. 374 (1967).
76 Landvardt, supra note 69, at 480–495. A false light cause of action alleges that a defendant
publicly presented a person in a false light that would be deeply offensive or embarrassing to a
reasonable person. The cases typically involve claims that the defendant wrongly said a person had a
certain belief, took an action not actually carried out, or participated in certain events during their life.
77 17 U.S.C. §107 (2006) provides:
75

Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all the above factors.
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first fair use factor instructing courts to consider “the purpose and character
of the use.”78 This contention, as far as I know, has not been raised to date.
It not only treads closely to the sorts of tort theories involving defamation
and false light publicity that invoke Constitutional limitations, but also
moves beyond the standard conceptions of fair use to encompass highly
insulting but culturally based uses not involving parody.
To work through some of the issues, consider a setting in which a
work like Cloud Gate was used in a video in a substantial rather than a de
minimis way. In addition, assume that the video was not an artistic, critical
evaluation of the aesthetics of the piece, nor a parodic use, but a lengthy
castigation of the sculpture in a personal diatribe or in a highly unflattering
or misleading social commentary or context. Here’s a transcription of the
N.R.A. verbal onslaught used during the video showing the publicly
displayed Cloud Gate.
They use their media to assassinate real news. They use their schools to teach
children that their president is another Hitler. They use their movie stars and
singers and comedy shows and award shows to repeat their narrative over and
over again. And then they use their ex-president to endorse “the resistance.”
All to make them march. Make them protest. Make them scream racism and
sexism and xenophobia and homophobia. To smash windows, burn cars, shut
down interstates and airports, bully and terrorize the law-abiding — until the
only option left is for the police to do their jobs and stop the madness.
And when that happens, they’ll use it as an excuse for their outrage. The only
way we stop this, the only way we save our country and our freedom, is to
fight this violence of lies with the clenched fist of truth.
I’m the National Rifle Association of America. And I’m freedom’s safest
place.79

In the actual video Cloud Gate’s brief appearance occurred along with
the line at the end of the first paragraph: “And then they use their expresident to endorse ‘the resistance.’”80 Suppose instead that the sculpture

78 There also is an intriguing possibility that moral right provisions in 17 U.S.C. §106A protect
authors from distortions or mutilations of works of visual art that are insulting depictions rather than
physical alterations. Traditionally moral right in the United States has only dealt with physical
distortions or mutilations. Altering or recklessly restoring a painting is one thing. Maliciously using an
image of a work in a setting that an artist views as deeply insulting or inappropriate is thought to be in a
different realm.
79 Don Irvine, Liberals Accuse New IRA Ad of Inciting Violence, ACCURACY IN MEDIA (June 30,
2017),
www.aim.org/don-irvine-blog/liberals-accuse-new-nra-ad-of-inciting-violence/
[https://perma.cc/Z8GP-DV8A].
80 NRA, Join the National Rifle Association (June 29, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/NRA
/videos/1605896562755373/ [https://perma.cc/GGB9-2QZ8].
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appeared for ten seconds while this revised first paragraph with changes
from the original italicized or struck through, played:
They use their media and art to assassinate real news. They use their schools
to teach children that their president is another Hitler. They use their movie
stars and singers and comedy shows and award shows and artists to repeat
their narrative over and over again. And then they use their ex-president to
endorse their cultural and political “the resistance.”

Should such a display be justifiable as fair use?
While the answer is unclear, the question is worth pondering. If
personal or irrationally critical depictions of a creative work are made in a
cultural or political diatribe, does that mean they should almost
automatically escape a copyright infringement allegation because they are
fair use? In the revised Cloud Gate story just described, the longer
visualization of the work was surrounded with nastily framed language
intended to present the sculpture as part of a large social conspiracy to
“assassinate true news” and “endorse cultural and political ‘resistance.’”81
Does the first fair use factor in 17 U.S.C. §107 commanding the courts to
consider “the purpose and character of the use” as one analytical factor
leave room for declaring that it runs in favor of the copyright owner in a
setting like this? Is a showing of malice necessary before the factor may be
treated as favoring the copyright owner?
An apt comparison can be made between this example and the first
major Supreme Court fair use case—Harper & Row v. Nation
Enterprises.82 The Nation used a purloined manuscript to publish segments
of Ford’s account of the 1974 pardon of Richard Nixon contained in a soon
to be published Gerald Ford memoir for which Time, Inc. had agreed to
pay $25,000.83 The Court relied heavily on the notion that authors had
presumptive control over the ways their works would initially be revealed
to the public and that unpublished manuscripts were therefore entitled to a
high level of copyright protection—a notion vaguely rejected by Congress
when it added a new sentence to the end of the fair use section in the
copyright code. But the Court’s possible over-reliance on the unpublished
status of the soon to be released Ford memoir must be read in light of its
analysis of the first fair use factor dealing with the purpose and character of
the use. In addition to the Court noting that The Nation’s intent was to
scoop the main story and preempt the value paid by Time for the privilege
81

Id.
471 U.S. 539 (1985). The payment was to be in two segments of $12,500. The first had been
made by the time THE NATION article was released. The second payment was not made and the lawsuit
resulted.
83 A TIME TO HEAL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GERALD R. FORD (1979).
82
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of first releasing the story to the public, it also criticized the magazine for
its intentional misbehavior:
Also relevant to the “character” of the use is “propriety of the defendant’s
conduct, 3 Nimmer §13.05[A] * * *. “Fair use presupposes ‘good faith’ and
‘fair dealing.’” Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F.Supp. 130, 146
(SDNY 1968) * * *. The trial court found that The Nation knowingly
exploited a purloined manuscript. * * * Unlike the typical claim of fair use,
The Nation cannot offer up even the fiction of consent as justification. Like its
competitor newsweekly, it was free to bid for the right of abstracting excerpts
from “A Time to Heal.” Fair use “distinguishes between ‘a true scholar and a
chiseler who infringes a work for personal profit.’” Wainwright Securities Inc.
v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d, at 94, quoting from Hearings on
Bills for the General Revision of the Copyright Law before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. 3, p. 1706 (1966)
(statement of John Schulman). The trial court found that The Nation
knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript. Unlike the typical claim of fair
use, The Nation cannot offer up even the fiction of consent as justification.84

A fair use claimant entering the fray with a seriously tainted frame of
mind, the Court suggested, cannot easily justify reliance on fair use
doctrine to provide it with a defense to infringement. And note well that the
Court did not impose any requirement that the taint arose from malicious
actions. Although making deeply maligning claims about the meaning of a
work certainly is not the same as reliance on a purloined manuscript, it
does raise the same general question—the import of a party’s state of mind
when using a copyrighted work and then claiming fair use. The Court’s
treatment of The Nation’s misbehavior was appropriate. Since fair use
analysis is an open-ended factor analysis, the nature of the defendant’s state
of mind is only one of many facts that must be taken into account. It is not
a highly focused issue like malice in a defamation case. It is balanced
against the creativity of the defendant’s handiwork, the impact of that work
on the market for the plaintiff’s copyrighted product, the scale of the
copying undertaken by the defendant, and other factors the court
reasonably elects to analyze. My contention, therefore, is both simple to
grasp and limited in its impact. It is only that the frame of mind behind
copying a work can be so problematic so as to justify a conclusion that the
“purpose and character” of its use cannot easily be labeled as fair under the
first factor dealing with the nature and character of the use. While stating
the issue that way obviously is vague, that is no different than many other
difficult line- drawing efforts made in the fair use arena. Perhaps Kapoor

84

82

471 U.S. 539, at 562–563.
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should be able to more easily challenge a fair use claim in the revised
example at issue here.
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B.

Architecture

1. The Leicester Case: Sculpture or Architecture?
Andrew Leicester v. Warner Brothers85 was a fascinating case that
coped with the line between sculpture and architecture and, as a result,
faced the array of differences in the statutory definitions of the two forms
of creativity and in the contrasting treatment of the right of copyright
owners to control the ways public displays of their works are used.
Sculptural objects with some utilitarian uses are protected only if the
aesthetic contents are separable from their utility.86 The right of copyright
owners to control uses of publicly displayed works eligible for copyright,
however, is quite broad, subject of course to common defenses, such as de
minimis presence and fair use. Architecture, by contrast, is defined to
include its form and arrangement of spaces without regard to its
usefulness.87 But control by architects over most uses of their publicly
displayed, constructed works are barred.88 17 U.S.C. §120(a) provides that:
The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does not
include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of
pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work,
if the building in which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily
visible from a public place.

The legislative history of this section clearly suggests that Congress
intended to deprive copyright owners of works of architecture of the
exclusive right to control most uses of their publicly displayed works.
The definitional and public display issues for both sculpture and
architecture were at stake in Leicester. The complex dispute arose over the
use in a super-hero film—Batman Forever—of images of a redevelopment
project in central Los Angeles at Figueroa and Eighth Streets.89 The main
part of the real estate venture, on land purchased from the Los Angeles
Community Redevelopment Agency, called for construction of a twentyfour story office building.90 R&T Development Corporation
85

232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000). The district court opinion is not reported but may be found at
Andrew Leicester v. Warner Bros., 1998 WL 34016724 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
86 See the definition of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” in 17 U.S.C. §101 (2010).
87 See supra note 3.
88 For related commentary see, David K. Stark, Grand Theft Architecture: Architectural Works in
Video Games After E.S.S. Entertainment v. Rockstar Games, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 429 (2010);
Andrew Inesi, Images of Public Places: Extending the Copyright Exemption for Pictorial
Representations of Architectural Works to Other Copyrighted Works, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 61 (2005).
89 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1213.
90 Id. at 1214.
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(“Developer”)91 purchased the land from the agency and hired TAC
International (“Architect”) to serve as architect for the project. Agency
rules required that a certain percentage of the cost be used for art projects.92
Architect commissioned Andrew Leicester (“Landscape Sculptor”) to
create the required artistic elements in and around a courtyard area on the
south side of the planned office structure.93 Part of the courtyard design
called for the construction of five columns or towers along Figueroa Street
to maintain a streetwall effect and create a grand entrance to the courtyard
and office building.94 Two images of the some of the towers are pictured
below,95 the first with an image of the office building behind the towers.
FIG. 8: THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT COLUMNS AT ISSUE IN THE
LEICESTER CASE

Replicas of the Figueroa Street development became elements of the
background imagery in the Batman Forever super-hero film.96 In 1994
91

To make the story easier to follow, I provide a brief description of each of the main actors—
developer, architect, and landscape sculptor—in the creation of the project.
92 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1214.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 The
images may be found at http://www.publicartinla.com/Downtown/ZanjaMadre
/column2.html [https://perma.cc/NL2K-Q4TZ].
96 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1215.
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Warner Brothers approached Developer seeking permission to photograph
the property for use in the movie.97 Without consulting either Architect or
Landscape Sculptor, Developer granted Warner Brothers permission to
make replicas and pictorial representations of the development for use in
the film.98 Portions of the works were used in the movie, as well as in
various promotional materials.99 The two columns pictured above with
circular structures at their peaks, designed as part of the required artistic
investment in the project, were among the items used in Batman Forever.100
Segments of Architect’s building project also showed up in the film as the
Second Bank of Gotham. Here are two samples containing the work of both
Architect and Landscape Sculptor.101
FIG. 9: FIGUEROA STREET STREET DEVELOPMENT IMAGES USED IN
BATMAN FOREVER

97

Id.
Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 The
first is at Second Bank of Gotham, BATMAN ANTHOLOGY WIKI,
http://batmananthology.wikia.com/wiki/Second_Bank_of_Gotham?file=SecondBank.jpg
[https://perma.cc/ZP3G-X7C2]. The second is at Sid Spano, Batman Forever (1995) Review, SID
SPANO’S MOVIE REVIEWS AND NEWS (SEP. 30, 2014), http://sidspano108.blogspot.com
/2014/09/batman-forever-1995-review.html [https://perma.cc/7G7K-Q8DA].
98
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2. The Legal Issues in Leicester
A series of issues surfaced in the case. First, the copyright ownership
provisions in the contracts between Developer, Architect, and Landscape
Sculptor were complex and ambiguous. Second, disagreements arose over
whether some of the artistic aspects of the project were sculptural and
others architectural or whether everything was part of the architecture
associated with the main office building.102 Controversies over the
copyright relationships between the sculptural and architectural features of
the development arose because of the statutory differences in the scope of
protection afforded to various aspects of the project. That led to the
relevance of §120(a)’s limitations on control over third party use of
publicly displayed architectural works becoming a decisive arena of
contention.
Without reviewing in detail all of the contractual controversies, suffice
it to say that their resolution led to a strange set of relationships between
Developer, Architect, and Landscape Sculptor. First, the trial and appellate
courts found that different provisions of the agreements governed the rights
of Warner Brothers to make two- versus three-dimensional likenesses of
the Figueroa Street project.103 Based on construction of the contractual
terms, the court concluded that Developer had an exclusive right to make or
grant others the right to make three-dimensional replicas or models of the
buildings and related structures.104 Exclusive control over two-dimensional
102
103
104

Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1215.
Id. at 1215, 1220.
Id. at 1220.
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images, however, remained in the hands of Architect and Landscape
Sculptor as joint authors105 of the streetwall towers. Though Architect’s
non-exclusive grant of authority to Developer to use the joint works in twodimensional imagery was valid,106 Developer’s attempt to reassign the same
license to Warner Brothers failed. The court held that non-exclusive
assignees like Developer could not further transfer those rights; that
authority remained with Architect and Landscape Sculptor as joint owners
of the exclusive rights in two-dimensional images.107 The result meant that
the only real dispute in the case was over Developer’s invalid grant of
authority to Warner Brothers to make two-dimensional images of the
Figueroa Street development for use in the movie and in advertising.
Warner Brothers was free to make only three-dimensional replicas.
Whether certain features Landscape Sculptor worked on with
Architect were distinct, separate sculptural works or part of the
architectural contours of the larger office building project turned out to be
the crucial issue in the case. The only features of the development
Landscape Sculptor worked on that Warner Brothers used in twodimensional imagery were the towers or columns along Figueroa Street
pictured above.108 If those columns were separate sculptural works, then the
exclusive right to control use of publicly displayed works was controlled by
the straightforward terms of 17 U.S.C §106(5), the statute’s exclusive right
to control public display and associated uses as discussed in reviewing the
disputes over REVOK’s graffiti and Kapoor’s Cloud Gate. If the towers
were part of the architecture, however, then the broad exception to control
over use of publicly displayed works embedded in 17 U.S.C §120(a)
governed.
3. Sculpture or Architecture?
The court opined that the streetwall columns were architectural—a
result that certainly is questionable. According to the court, several features

105 The copyright statute provides that two or more authors will hold a joint interest in a work if
they intend “that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole.” 17 U.S.C. §107. The court concluded that such an intention was present because Leicester and
TAC worked closely together in designing the streetwall portion of the project. Leicester, 232 F.3d at
1215.
106 Leicester did not participate in these negotiations. But like tenants in common in tangible
property law, joint authors of exclusive rights in copyright each have the right to assign their interests to
a third party. While they have the obligation to share royalties and other benefits, the transfers are valid.
That meant that R&T could assign a non-exclusive right to Warner Brothers without Leicester’s
participation. Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1215.
107 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1220.
108 Id. at 1216.
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of the columns led to this result.109 First, they were deemed to be part of a
“streetwall” concept integrated into the overall architectural scheme.110 The
Community Redevelopment Agency plan for the area required that the
building line along Figueroa Street be maintained.111 Second, Architect and
Landscape Sculptor worked together to plan the elements of the
streetwall;112 that is why they were deemed to be joint authors of the work.
Third, though the interior elements of the courtyard behind the streetwall,
gate, and fencing were part of an overall artistic design created solely by
Landscape Sculptor, the columns and other elements of the structures along
Figueroa Street were said by the court to serve separate purposes and
different aesthetic goals from the courtyard features.113 The courtyard plan,
called Zanje Madre (or Mother Ditch), “tell[s] an allegorical story of Los
Angeles,”114 the court said, by visualizing the developments that brought
water to the city. Fourth, the height, materials, and elements of the columns
echoed similar features of the office building and were, therefore, wellintegrated into the overall architectural design and quite separate from the
Zanje Madre.115 Finally, Landscape Sculptor’s contention that various
decorative elements of the columns making up the streetwall should be
separated from the features deemed by the court to be architectural,116 and
therefore, provided their own display rights was rejected. It was deemed
not possible to rationally make such a separation from the architectural
plan. Since the statutory definition of a sculptural work in 17 U.S.C. §101
requires that the artistic expression of a work be separable from any
utilitarian content—here the building—in order to obtain protection,
Landscape Sculptor could not claim any intellectual property rights.
Not surprisingly there was a dissent in the case on the final conclusion
that the sculptural elements of the columns could not be conceptually
separated from the overall architectural design.117 Judge Fisher accused the
majority of misreading the district court opinion by concluding that the
lower court decided as a factual matter that the design elements of
Landscape Sculptor’s work could not be conceptually severed from the
building plan.118 Fisher was correct in claiming that the lower court actually
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 1217–19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1217–19.
Id.
Id. at 1225–1236.
That is, in fact, what the majority did. See id. at 1219.
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concluded that no sculptural work that was part of a building could be
treated as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work. District Judge Hupp
wrote:
[T]he intent of Congress was to substitute the new protection afforded
architectural works for the previous protection sometimes provided under the
conceptual separability test for non-utilitarian sculptures (such as gargoyles
and stained glass windows) incorporated into a work of architecture. If this
construction is correct, the enactment of Section 120(a) had the effect of
limiting the conceptual separability concept to situations not involving
architectural works.119

Judge Hupp’s construction of §120(a) was illogical at best. If taken
literally it would mean that murals, sculptural reliefs, and other items long
thought to be protected as pictorial or sculptural works when lodged in a
building have lost their separate copyright status. Moreover, his opinion is
entirely inconsistent with the moral right protections for works “in or made
part of” a building embedded in 17 U.S.C. §113(d).120 It is difficult to
imagine that moral right provision was totally repealed by 17 U.S.C.
§120(a) when protections for buildings in which sculptural works are
embedded gained copyright protection. Judge Fisher’s conclusion that a
sculptor and an architect might own separate copyrights for two different
kinds of works—one for sculpture embedded in a building and the other for
the building—seems indisputably correct.121 And it is worth noting that the
towers, along with the Zanje Madre courtyard features, were design
features that fulfilled the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency
requirement that a portion of the development cost be devoted to artistic
endeavors.122
Concurring Judge Tashima, in a somewhat cryptic opinion,123 reached
an intermediate position but thought the result reached by Judge Rymer
was proper. Tashima apparently agreed that a sculptural work that was part
of an overall architectural design should be treated as part of the building
without regard to its conceptual separability, but he was unwilling to
conclude that all sculptural works embedded in a work of architecture met
that test. What it meant for a work to be part of an overall architectural
design was left open in his opinion. The bottom line was that the sculptural
elements of the columns along Figueroa Street were not subject to the
119 The unreported opinion may be found at Andrew Leicester v. Warner Bros., 1998 WL
34016724 *6 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
120 See supra note 27.
121 Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1229–30.
122 Id. at 1214.
123 Id. at 1220.
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traditional test for determining the copyrightability of a sculptural work
embedded in a utilitarian object or architectural work.
4. Different Norms for Sculpture and Architecture
The problem in Leicester arose largely because of illogical
distinctions in the basic terms of copyright protection for sculpture and
architecture. As previously noted,124 the definitions in the act for pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works, and works of architecture are significantly
different. The former “include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as
their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the
design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article.”125 A work of architecture, however,
“includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of
spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual standard
features.”126
To explore the potential consequences of these definitions, apply them
to I.M. Pei’s East Wing of the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C.
and to Frank Gehry’s well-known Pritzker Pavilion in Millennium Park in
Chicago, not far from Anish Kapoor’s Cloud Gate. Images of the two
structures are below.127

124

See supra note 3.
Id.
126 Id.
127 The image of the East Wing is available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NGApjt1.jpg [https://perma.cc/9ST2-6Z4C]. The image of the Pritzker Pavilion is available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/architecture-org/files/modules/jay-pritzker-pavilion-eric-allix-rogers-05.jpg
[https://perma.cc/VYM6-8S5M].
125
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FIG. 10: I. M. PEI’S EAST WING OF THE NATIONAL GALLERY AND
FRANK GEHRY’S PRITZKER PAVILION IN MILLENNIUM PARK
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Are these designs sculptural works or works of architecture? Could
they (or should they) be both? The Leicester court seemed to reflexively
conclude that the two categories are mutually exclusive. However, there is
nothing in the code justifying that conclusion.128 They will qualify as a
“sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that . . . sculptural
features . . . can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”129 Just because
something is large, capable of accommodating use by human beings, and
designed by an architect doesn’t mean it lacks separable sculptural
qualities. But if the East Wing is considered “utilitarian,” as architecture
generally was prior to its addition as a separate category of protected
copyrightable work in 1990130, it may not be possible to meet the pictorial,
graphic or sculptural work test. It is very difficult to identify any sculptural
elements of I. M. Pei’s architectural design that are separate in any
conceptual or actual way from the building’s utility as a museum. No
particular part of the design can be removed without dismantling the
exterior shape or the interior flow. While it is possible to remove all twoand three-dimensional artistic artifacts contained in the museum’s
collection and other features of the museum from the building and think of
it as a sculpture, that is not really a separation of utility and sculptural
design for it leaves the basic features of the building totally intact. Unless
the entire design is considered to be a sculpture as well as a work of
architecture, certainly a plausible conclusion, it can only be the latter.
On the other hand, it may be easier to treat the Pritzker Pavilion as a
sculpture, at least in part. The various curved metallic features surrounding
the stage area are “separable”—hung on a metal support frame that also
encloses many of the various utilitarian parts of the pavilion serving
orchestras and other performance groups that make use of the facility. An
image from behind the building, displayed below,131 makes this quite clear.
128

There is ambiguity about this point in the history of the code. Some legislative history suggests
the two categories must be kept separate. But the code language itself does not automatically yield that
result. See Vanessa N. Scaglione, Note, Building upon the Architectural Works Protection Copyright
Act of 1990, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 193, 201–04 (1992).
129 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
130 For a history of the adoption and background of the Architectural Works Copyright Protection
Act of 1990 see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists
Rights Acts and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 477 (1989).
131 Available at https://en.wikiarquitectura.com/building/jay-pritzker-pavilion-at-the-milleniumpark/ [https://perma.cc/H39V-SSNV].
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FIG. 11: BACKSTAGE VIEW OF FRANK GEHRY’S PRITZKER PAVILION

These images suggest the major problem with the definition of a
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work in the Copyright Act—that sleek,
modern building designs or parts of those designs struggle to meet the
definitional test of sculpture; while appliqué or other features that may
easily be conceptually or actually removed from buildings, leaving the
utilitarian features behind, are easier to protect as sculptural. The same
problem exists in the industrial design arena. Consider two industrial
designs from famous cases—the Ribbon bicycle rack denied copyright
protection in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber, Co.132
and the lamp base granted protection in Mazer v. Stein.133 The idea for use
of the ribbon shape for securely storing bicycles actually arose from a wire
sculpture.134 Nonetheless, the court concluded that its utilitarian aspects
could not be separated from its sculptural qualities.135 Compare this with the
classic case of Mazer v. Stein from which the wording of the present
statutory definition of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works was derived.136
132 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). Image available at https://www.ribbonrack.com/about.shtml
[https://perma.cc/889H-XFAC].
133 347 U.S. 201 (1959). Images available at http://coolcopyright.com/contents/chapter-4/mazer-vstein [https://perma.cc/M9ML-4Z67].
134 Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1143.
135 Id. at 1147.
136 The legislative history of the 1976 Act makes clear that the intention of Congress was to codify
the result of Mazer. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54–55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5667–68.
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In Mazer, lamp bases, pictured below, were deemed to be copyrightable—
separable from their utilitarian functions as lamps by simply removing all
the electrical parts.137 The two cases vividly demonstrate the differences in
judicial treatment of sleek, modern designs and traditional shapes and
imagery.
FIG. 12: STATUARY LAMP BASES IN MAZER V. STEIN

137

Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202, 212–13.
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In Leicester the utility/expression dichotomy inherent in the
definition of sculptural works was used as a baseline by all three judges for
arguments over whether the design of the columns on Figueroa Street could
be treated as sculptural. For the majority, they could not be separated from
the utility of the building itself because they were closely integrated into
the overall design of the project.138 For the dissent the outcome was
dependent on application of the traditional test described here, a test that
allowed the columns to be treated as separable from the design of the
building itself and for various features of the towers such as the circular
elements at the peaks to be treated as discrete from the bodies of the
towers.139 Gaze again at the images of the Figueroa Street project above.140
The relevant columns are those with circular structures at the top. The
majority relied upon the use of similar materials in the columns and
building, and on the streetwall impact of the columns and fencing.141 The
dissent, on the other hand, found it relatively easy to separate the novel
features of the column tops from the rest of them.142 The fact that the
columns were separated by a significant distance from the building itself
contributed to his conclusion that sculptural works were present.143 Partial
138
139
140
141
142
143
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Andrew Leicester v. Warner Brothers, 232 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1225.
See FIG. 9.
Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1218.
Id. at 1221–22.
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use of the same materials as the main office buildings didn’t automatically
negate the sculptural qualities of the shapes used in the column, shapes that
were quite distinct from anything in the office structure. The dissenting
judge understood much more about the nature of sculptural endeavors and
the variety of ways they can be linked to structures without being
subsumed by them.
But once the Leicester court concluded that the columns were
architectural and that their sculptural elements could not be separated from
the rest of the project, the plaintiffs had to lose. The broad exemption from
control over use of publicly displayed architecture in §120(a) rendered the
claims hopeless. Since the section precluded owners of architecture
copyrights from pursuing licenses from those making, distributing, or
publicly displaying images of the structures, there was nothing Landscape
Sculptor, now labelled as a part designer of a building, could do to require
payment from Warner. Put Anish Kapoor’s Cloud Gate in the same spot,
however, and the result would have been transformed. For none of the
factors leading the Leicester majority to conclude the towers were
architectural would be present if Kapoor’s work was part of the street wall
concept mandated by the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment
Agency. And that’s the point. It is irrational that two copyrightable works
publicly displayed in virtually identical ways end up with wholly different
protective envelopes. It is clear that the Copyright Act must be revised to
either protect both from use as significant backdrops in audiovisual works
or to protect neither one.
II. THE DENOUEMENT: IRRATIONALITY RESOLVED
Several important aspects of the exclusive right to publicly display
copyrighted works have already been discussed—the contours of
controlling the display right itself, the differing definitions of sculptural and
architectural works, and the impact of the public display exemption for
architectural works. And some conclusions have been suggested. First,
aspects of the standard defenses to allegations that the public display right
has been violated—most notably fair use—could stand a closer look.
Declining to consider irrationally demeaning displays of works as less
likely candidates for fair use seems inappropriate. Second, the definition of
a work of architecture as encompassing only “buildings” should be
reconsidered. Architecture encompasses a range of elements beyond those
usable by people. It is irrational to exclude non-habitable structures from
coverage. That becomes painfully apparent when it is recognized that the
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moral right provisions for works associated with buildings in 17 U.S.C.
§113(d) do not apply at all to graffiti or other works on constructed features
of our environment that are not buildings. That conclusion leads to a result
most will find strange—that the same moral rights applicable to classical
paintings and sculpture on traditional surfaces hanging in museums also
apply to graffiti painted without permission on structures that are not
buildings.
There are other anomalies exposed in this essay, however, that are
both more important and more difficult to resolve. First, the definitional
differences between sculpture and architecture created part of the tension in
the resolution of Leicester. That tension should be resolved. Second, the
principal reason for writing this essay—the irrational differences in the
display rights of pictorial, graphic, and sculpture work on the one hand and
architecture on the other need to be reconceived.
A. Protecting Rights in the Use of Publicly Displayed Sculpture and
Architecture
Copyright in a sculptural work is dependent on finding that its
“sculptural features . . . can be identified separately from, and are capable
of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” In
contrast, a work of architecture is a building and “includes the overall form
as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the
design, but does not include individual standard features.” The differences
are profound. Separating design and utility is an entirely different
enterprise from discerning the overall form and arrangement of spaces and
elements of a building. The former requires an inquiry that is incompatible
with the goals of many artists and industrial designers. The latter, on the
other hand, fits nicely with the predilections of both artists and architects
and should become the basic definitional standard for sculpture, industrial
design, and architecture.
The very notion that aesthetics and function, or in copyright
vocabulary, expression and utility, should be split apart when legal
protection is considered has been anathema to many artists and architects
for decades—long before the present statutory definition of pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works was adopted in 1976. While the ways
expression and utility are envisioned have been a subject of debate since
the advent of culture, they came into special focus in the late nineteenth
century with the rise of modern art and architecture. The phrase form
follows function, initially written as “form ever follows function,” was
coined by the famous architect Louis Sullivan shortly after his landmark
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Wainwright Building was constructed in St. Louis in 1891.144 He was a
member of the Chicago School of Architecture that, stimulated in part by
the Great Chicago Fire of 1871 that demolished large sections of the central
city, revolutionized commercial construction at the end of the nineteenth
and beginning of the twentieth centuries. In a famous essay Sullivan wrote:
Whether it be the sweeping eagle in his flight, or the open apple-blossom, the
toiling work-horse, the blithe swan, the branching oak, the winding stream at
its base, the drifting clouds, over all the coursing sun, form ever follows
function, and this is the law. Where function does not change, form does not
change. The granite rocks, the ever-brooding hills, remain for ages; the
lightning lives, comes into shape, and dies, in a twinkling.
It is the pervading law of all things organic and inorganic, of all things
physical and metaphysical, of all things human and all things superhuman, of
all true manifestations of the head, of the heart, of the soul, that the life is
recognizable in its expression, that form ever follows function. This is the
law.145

As can be seen from the pictures below of the Wainwright Building
and some of its beautiful cornice detail work,146 Sullivan’s ideas did not
mandate the elimination of all ornate features. Quite the contrary, once the
basic function of a building was established, both its engineering and shape
became determinable. In this case, a steel frame allowed the shape and
fenestration of the building to reflect its function as an office container.
Crafting designs taken from nature—here floral filigree and other natural
sculptural shapes in the cornice and other areas of the building—reflected
Sullivan’s desire to integrate the inherent function of a building into the
nature and essence of human existence. Indeed, many of the most famous
early skyscrapers built in Chicago, New York, and other cities featured the
same aesthetic. The early years of Frank Lloyd Wright’s career were in
Chicago, including a stint at the firm of Adler & Sullivan between 1888
and 1893 as the Wainwright Building was being designed. Many of
Wright’s early buildings reflected some of the same stylistic features.
While it is possible to think of aspects of the Wainwright Building’s ornate,
sculptural facade as separable from the rest of the shape of the building,
and therefore sculptural for copyright purposes, Sullivan (and Wright)
would have rebelled at the idea that the work mimicking aspects of nature
144 Louis H. Sullivan, The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered, LIPPINCOTT’S MAG., Mar.
1896, at 403, 408.
145 Id.
146 Available at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/52/Wainwright_Building__2012.JPG [https://perma.cc/58VW-4MTT]; https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wainright_6.jpg
[https://perma.cc/6QPL-WD8M]. The copyright commons terms are provided on these pages.
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was merely conceptually separable appliqué. Rather it was inherent in the
way nature, form, and function worked together in the process of designing
and using a building, just like they worked together in nature.
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FIG. 13: SULLIVAN’S WAINWRIGHT BUILDING AND ITS CORNICE
DETAIL

Others worked with related ideas, but reduced form and function to
minimalist designs—a natural outgrowth of architectural theories like
Sullivan’s. One of the primary goals of the famous Bauhaus School—the
creative force behind much of early twentieth century art, industrial design,
and architecture—was to craft designs that were simple, useful, and
beautiful. While some of those working there early in its history used
various crafts in their designs that followed closely in the footsteps of the
Chicago School of Architecture’s use of natural motifs, others such as Le
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Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, and Walter Gropius147 developed a much
sparer architectural style; painters at the school like Paul Klee and Wassily
Kandinsky followed suit in their early careers.148 When Corbusier designed
a model house called Villa Savoye a generation after the construction of the
Wainwright Building, he opined that it was a “machine for living.”149
Designed with thin cement support columns and largely unobstructed
floors, it allowed for maximum flexibility and modification over time as
families or owners changed. Heavily influenced by the Bauhaus School and
other modernists of the time, he developed a style that intimately wove
together the functionality, purpose, and beauty in buildings and useful
designs.

147 Walter Gropius left Germany in 1934 after Hitler’s rise to power and came to the United States
in 1937. He continued to design many buildings, including his own house in Lincoln, Massachusetts
outside of Boston. It is a fine example of his design style. Images of the house available at
https://www.historicnewengland.org/property/gropius-house/ [https://perma.cc/UJ53-N94F].
148 See, e.g., Alexxa Gotthardt, A Brief History of Bauhaus Master and Father of Abstraction Paul
Klee, ARTSY (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-what-you-need-to-knowabout-paul-klee
[https://perma.cc/WXN5-RHFN];
Bauhaus,
KANDINSKY,
https://www.wassilykandinsky.net/bauhaus.php [https://perma.cc/NAC4-3EDK].
149 The house was constructed between 1928 and 1931. A nice summary of Le Corbusier’s ideas
may be found in Kurt Kohlstedt, Machines for Living In: Le Corbusier’s Pivotal “Five Points of
Architecture”, 99% INVISIBLE (Feb. 19, 2018), https://99percentinvisible.org/article/machines-living-lecobusiers-pivotal-five-points-architecture/ [https://perma.cc/X8WB-UUA9].
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FIG. 14: LE CORBUSIER’S VILLA SAVOYE, CONSTRUCTED BETWEEN
1928–1931

From the image of Villa Savoye above150 it is easy to see why Le
Corbusier’s aesthetic was so closely related to other well-known painters,
sculptors, and industrial designers of the early twentieth century. Various
aesthetic media were culturally tightly linked, both at the Bauhaus and in
the larger culture. Many of the designs at the famous Bauhaus School,
where Le Corbusier worked for a time, were specifically oriented toward
the merger of aesthetics and function in easily identifiable, highly useful
designs. Some of their most famous objects were chairs by Marcel Breuer
and Mies van der Rohe. Two are pictured below, the first by Breuer and the
second by Mies.151 While the contemporary copyright definition of
sculptural works may well have excluded these designs from coverage for
lack of separability were it applicable a century ago when they were
created, the present architecture definition fits them to a tee. A similar

150

Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:VillaSavoye.jpg [https://perma.cc/2LBE-DNVZ].
The image of the Breuer on the left is available at https://www.moma.org/collection/works/2851
[https://perma.cc/GUN6-EFP4]; the Mies image is available at https://www.metmuseum.org/art
/collection/search/482117 [https://perma.cc/54XP-EAL4].
151

103

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

conclusion applies to a Bauhaus designed lamp152 pictured to the right
below.
FIG. 15: CHAIRS BY BREUER (LEFT) AND MIES (CENTER); BAUHAUS
LAMP (RIGHT).

The powerful influence of the form/function movement is reflected in
two images of other creations—one of the 1902 Ward Willits House by
Frank Lloyd Wright153 and the next of a 1936 Piet Mondrian painting.154 In
both designs the desire was to achieve a statement of basic form and line.
In the house, of course, there is a function; it is revealed in the form and
shape of the dwelling. But the overall appearance of the two is quite
similar—the use of simple lines to demarcate fields of visual interest, the
classic rectangularity of the compositions, and the overall similarity in
aesthetics. Imagine the Willits House on a very snowy day. The black and
white composition created by such weather would mimic the Mondrian
work in many ways. A vague idea of that result is provided by the image of
just the central portion of the Willits House, displayed just below the
Mondrian painting.

152 Available at https://www.moma.org/collection/works/1546 [https://perma.cc/9TB9-ZPQR]. It is
not attributed to a particular craftsperson but is listed as a 1928 creation of the Metal Workshop at the
Bauhaus School.
153 Available
at
http://www.greatbuildings.com/buildings/Ward_Willits_House.html
[https://perma.cc/C5ZZ-Z4S7].
154 Composition in White, Black, and Red, MOMA, https://www.moma.org/collection/works/78310
[https://perma.cc/Z7Z6-AQCB].

104

17:55 (2019)

The Right to Control Uses of Publicly Displayed Works

FIG. 16: FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT’S WARD WILLITS HOUSE (UPPER
LEFT); PIET MONDRIAN PAINTING (UPPER RIGHT); SHERLE WAGNER
PLUMBING FIXTURE AD (LOWER LEFT); CROPPED IMAGE OF WARD
WILLITS HOUSE (LOWER RIGHT).

One of my favorite useful design advertisements that communicates
the same set of Bauhaus-based ideas is for a set of bathroom sink fixtures.
The caption for the 1979 advertisement pictured above, “SHERLE
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WAGNER ERASES THE LINE BETWEEN FUNCTION AND ART,”
captures perfectly the aesthetic of much art, architecture, and industrial
design since the turn of the twentieth century.155 While certain features of
these fixtures, such as the bulbous faucet handles, might be thought of as
separable from their utility and therefore protectable as sculptural works
under the Copyright Act, it defies the goals of the manufacturer—to say
nothing of much of the rest of the industrial design world—to require that
step in order to obtain protection.
While there are no obvious aesthetic reasons why different standards
should apply to the various designs of buildings, works of art, and useful
articles, revising the law to treat them in similar ways is not a
straightforward proposition. First, protection of industrial designs as a
separate class of intellectual property objects was specifically rejected by
Congress when the 1976 code revamping the law was adopted.156 Later
proposals have also failed to pass, except for a very limited set of
provisions protecting vessel hulls adopted in 1998.157 Reviewing the
reasons for removal of design protection from the 1976 Act is important.
Second, copyrights generally last for a period of life of the author plus
seventy years for individually crafted works or ninety-five years from
publication for works for hire.158 While that period is surely too long for all
copyrights,159 it becomes clearly objectionable for industrial designs.160 Is it
possible to both change the definitional standard for sculptural works to
encompass industrial designs while denying such works long-term
protection? Can the definitions of sculpture and utilitarian articles be made
to mesh coherently?
When the copyright law was rewritten in 1976, the Senate passed
industrial design provisions as a separate part of their version of the

155

Available at http://www.archive.sherlewagner.com/legacy/ [https://perma.cc/W5WT-XP9X].
For a fulsome history of Congressional consideration of industrial design protection in the
Copyright Act see Industrial Design Protection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R.
902, H.R. 3017 and H.R. 3499, at 436–91 (1991) (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
157 17 U.S.C §§ 1301–1332 (2000).
158 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
159 Though my concerns were brushed aside by the United States Supreme Court in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) by the tribunals giving broad authority to Congress to determine the
appropriate duration for copyrights, the result has been harshly critiqued. See Qianwei Fu, Eldred v.
Ashcroft: Failure in Balancing Incentives and Access, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1755 (2005).
160 A similar issue arises with respect to the present use of copyright law to cover software, now
often called “firmware” because it is designed into the electronics of devices. It has become so much a
part of modern digital technology that such long-term protection is out of place. Technology changes
much too quickly for any long duration period to be rational in this arena.
156
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statute.161 It was stripped out by the House before adoption.162 The Senate
proposals contained two different definitions—one for pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works and another for useful articles.163 The former lacked
any language about separability, leaving only a simple definition of such
works as “two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic,
and applied art.”164 The latter merged the content of utility and various
aspects of the design into a single definition, reproduced below.165 That
language, together with the duration proposals, are critically important for
purposes of this essay.166 When the House removed design protection from
the legislation, the separability language of the definition of pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural was inserted into the code to preserve copyright as a
distinct arena from industrial design. That left designs covered under
copyright law only if they had sculptural features separable from the
object’s utility. In hindsight, that move was an error of judgment.
The covered useful designs were described in the failed Senate
proposal as follows:
DESIGNS PROTECTED
Sec. 201. (a) The author or other proprietor of an original ornamental design
of a useful article may secure the protection provided by this title upon
complying with and subject to the provisions hereof.
(b) For the purposes of this title—
(1) A “useful article” is an article which in normal use has an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or
to convey information. An article which normally is a part of a useful article
shall be deemed to be a useful article.
(2) The “design of a useful article”, hereinafter referred to as a “design”,
consists of those aspects or elements of the article, including its twodimensional or three-dimensional features of shape and surface, which make
up the appearance of the article.
(3) A design is “ornamental” if it is intended to make the article attractive or
distinct in appearance.
(4) A design is “original” if it is the independent creation of an author who did
not copy it from another source.

161
162
163
164
165
166

See S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 11–12 (1975).
See supra note 156.
S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 3–4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Both may be found in S. REP. NO. 94–473.
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DESIGNS NOT SUBJECT TO PROTECTION
Sec. 202. Protection under this title shall not be available for a design that is—
(a) not original;
(b) staple or commonplace, such as a standard geometric figure, familiar
symbol, emblem, or motif, or other shape, pattern, or configuration which has
become common, prevalent, or ordinary;
(c) different from a design excluded by subparagraph (b) above only in
insignificant details or in elements which are variants commonly used in the
relevant trades; or
(d) dictated solely by a utilization function of the article that embodies it;
(e) composed of three-dimensional features of shape and surface with respect
to men’s, women’s, and children’s apparel, including undergarments and
outerwear.167

There are several very notable features of these proposals to protect
“an original ornamental design of a useful article.”168 First, according to
§201, the utility and design of a useful article are treated as a single
entity.169 In contrast to the present definition of a sculptural work, there is
no requirement that aesthetics and function be split.170 Such an item has “an
intrinsic utilitarian function” not constructed “merely to portray . . .[its]
appearance.”171 The “ornamental design of a useful article”—the expression
protected by the scheme—”consists of those aspects or elements of the
article, including its two-dimensional or three-dimensional features of
shape and surface, which make up the appearance of the article” and is
“intended to make the article attractive or distinct in appearance.”172 And
§202 excludes from coverage “a standard geometric figure . . . motif, or
other common shape . . . which has become prevalent, or ordinary.”173 In
essence these provisions function much like the definition of architecture
which includes the overall form and composition of spaces, while
excluding standard features. Its use would dramatically simplify the
question as to whether a three-dimensional object with useful attributes
could be treated as a sculptural work. Any original attractive aspect of a
useful item, whether easily considered to be a separable aspect of the piece
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
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S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 39.
Id.
Id.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
S. REP. NO. 94–473, at 39.
Id.
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or not, would be capable of receiving protection. The definition would have
the substantial impact of treating any three-dimensional item with a
utilitarian function as an ornamental design rather than a sculpture. The
esoteric and often difficult task of splitting apart the various aspects of a
three-dimensional object that has useful functions would end.
The term provisions in §205 (not quoted here) are equally
intriguing.174 Protection would begin on the date of publication of the
registration and run for a maximum of ten years, divided into an initial term
of five years and a renewal term for another five. While the renewal
provisions are cumbersome and unnecessary, the basic idea that design
protection should be short-lived makes imminently good sense. But is it
possible to mesh such provisions into the overall copyright scheme
covering sculpture, design, and architecture? Can article design protection
for ten years (or any other short term that might be proposed) work with the
term for sculpture and architecture lasting for life plus seventy years for
individual or joint works or ninety-five years for works for hire?
On the surface it can be argued that the terms of protection for
architecture—basically another form of ornamental design of useful
objects—and useful industrial designs should be similarly treated. But in
reality it makes a great deal of sense to treat them quite differently. Major
architectural works tend to be unique or near-unique, expensive to design
and construct, and unlikely to be market dominating products. It is
unnecessary to treat them differently from other unique aesthetic designs.
While the general copyright term is too long, that applies equally to both
architecture and most other expressive undertakings covered by the act.
Neither needs that long a term to create incentives for their introduction
into the culture. Industrial designs, however, are much more often subject
to short term fads—a basic reason for providing protection—and short-term
market utility. Both their design and utility fashions frequently come and
go with some rapidity. There is no reason to protect them for a long time—
one that extends well beyond their typical economically useful life. All the
industrial designers really need is a reasonable market head start in order to
protect their investment and create incentives for well designed products. In
addition, in those atypical settings where industrial designs become
ubiquitous parts of our environment for significant periods of time, there
are good reasons to open up the market to competition after a fairly short
period of time to lower the risk of market dominance for a popular

174

Id. at 40.
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product—a risk not nearly as likely for architectural works or other
standard works covered by copyright.175
The shorter term of protection for useful designs would create a new
split in protection—one between sculpture and useful products
ornamentally designed. The former would retain the present lengthy term
of protection; the latter would be quite short. The boundary line between
the categories can be drawn as tightly as possible to reduce conflict and
litigation. The simplest path is to treat all products with a utilitarian use as
designs and not sculpture. The test for protection should not be separability
of form and function, but a test far simpler to administer about whether
utility exists at all. Such a test already exists in the copyright statute. The
limited design protections for boat vessel hulls adopted in 1998 apply to
“an original design of a useful article which makes the article attractive or
distinctive in appearance to the purchasing or using public.”176 The same
definition should be extended to cover other useful industrial designs.177
B. Public Display Controls
It already has been suggested that there is something deeply
inconsistent in allowing artists control over the use of public displays of
their works while wholly denying that right to architects. Using utility as a
dividing line or excuse for distinguishing between some of these works
makes neither aesthetic nor legal sense. Working through the issues
requires three steps. First, Congress presented some rationales for the
provisions in 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) rejecting control over public displays of
architecture when it was adopted. Those rationales require review. Second,
175 Note that most types of copyrighted works compete with each other. Novels contest market
share with other novels or books. The same is true of movies, television shows, dances, and pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works. There is very little likelihood of market dominance by a single work.
One exception may be computer software and firmware—an area which in many ways is analogous to
industrial design and should be granted a duration much like industrial design.
176 17 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1) (2000).
177 A related possibility would be to consider the import of design patents. 35 U.S.C. § 171(a)
protects an “ornamental design for an article of manufacture.” A full description of the requirements for
obtaining such a patent are described in Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Design Patent Evolution: From
Obscurity to Center Stage, 32 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 53 (2015). Like utility patents,
applications must be made to the Patent & Trademark Office and reviewed to ensure that the design is
novel and non-obvious. That process takes about fifteen months. Id. at 57. If granted, the patent extends
only to the design, not to the underlying article of manufacture. And it is likely that a design patent
could be held in addition to a copyright. Id. at 74–75. This suggests that further analysis here is not
really necessary. Since the two are not mutually exclusive, my goal to ensure greater consistency within
the structure of copyright law is not really affected by the existence of design patent protection. In
addition, the length of time and the expense required to obtain a design patent suggest that the
likelihood that many industrial designers would prefer to rely on easily obtained copyright protection
than the more cumbersome patent system. That would be particularly likely if the reforms suggested
here are put into effect.
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are there other justifications for treating sculpture and buildings differently
not mentioned during Congressional consideration of the provision? And
finally, if, as I have stated, the present provisions are unfair, what is the
best way to solve the problem?
When 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) was adopted the House Report provided the
following analysis of the provision:
Similar exceptions are found in many Berne member countries, and serve to
balance the interests of authors and the public. Architecture is a public art
form and is enjoyed as such. Millions of people visit our cities every year and
take back home photographs, posters, and other pictorial representations of
prominent works of architecture as a memory of their trip. Additionally,
numerous scholarly books on architecture are based on the ability to use
photographs of architectural works.
These uses do not interfere with the normal exploitation of architectural
works. Given the important public purpose served by these uses and the lack
of harm to the copyright owner’s market, the Committee chose to provide an
exemption, rather than rely on the doctrine of fair use, which requires ad hoc
determinations.178

Much of this commentary is perfectly legitimate. Architecture, at least
in its constructed versions, is a public art form. Photographs taken by
tourists in outdoor public spaces routinely contain images of buildings. And
scholarly works on architecture virtually always contain pictures of the
buildings under discussion. None of this forms a justifiable basis for total
exclusion of control over use of a publicly displayed piece of architecture.
All of these actions are typically treated as fair use for public sculpture; no
one would quarrel about them for public architecture either.
But the final use mentioned—posters—does not fall into the same
category. It is not an incidental consequence of the obvious visibility of
architecture. It does have a potential impact on the economic value of
copyrighted works and is not supported by the traditional settings in which
fair use is routinely found—de minimis use,179 critical commentary,
educational undertakings, and similar activities that have no significant
commercial impact on the value of an architectural work or of markets for
the architectural design. There is no logical reason for concluding that sale
178 H.R. REP. NO. 101–735, at 22 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6953. The
report contains materials on a number of acts that were merged together prior to enactment, including
the Copyright Amendments Act of 1990.
179 Another example of de minimis use would be taking skyline pictures a distance away from any
particular structure. In that setting no particular work of architecture is the centerpiece of attention. And
to the extent such images are sold, as souvenirs for example, the market is not based on a building but
on a cityscape.
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of posters of well-known paintings by museums should routinely be treated
as royalty producing events while sales of similar items picturing wellknown buildings are not. Indeed, it may be the case that poster sales are the
only important potential money making potential available to many
architects for exploiting the value of already constructed buildings. Though
the report was correct that fair use disputes sometime fall into open-ended
“ad hoc determinations,” that is not always so. And in this case, it is not
difficult to describe most of the settings in which granting architects an
exclusive right to control use of buildings’ public display would lead to
justifiable calls for licensing. None of them involve “horror stories” like
private citizens being asked to pay for the privilege of taking family
pictures in front of the East Wing of the National Gallery of Art. Indeed,
these cases would come out pretty much the same as disputes over picturetaking taken in front of Cloud Gate! Surely no one is going to be held liable
for snapping a family image while cavorting in the belly of that beast!180
And, assuming the basic structure of definitions of sculpture, industrial
designs, and architecture are merged, posters of industrial designs made
without permission also should be royalty producing events.
When buildings play an important role in movies, there is nothing
imaginary or fleeting about the money that architects could have
demanded. The architecture problem has been visible in many films,
though Leicester is the most important case in which the issues were
seriously litigated. Some very famous buildings have been significant
features in important films. They include The Dakota181 in Rosemary’s
Baby, The Bradbury Building182 in Blade Runner, and The Stanley Hotel183
in The Shining, to name just a few.184 Many others also have played
important roles.185 While owners certainly may demand fees for allowing
180 And the enormous numbers of people visiting Cloud Gate take enormous number of pictures
and videos when they visit. Just take a look at this video of a crowd of people milling about the work on
a beautiful day. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQbztwiojIQ [https://perma.cc/6FPA-JTRQ].
181 Completed in 1884, The Dakota was the first apartment building constructed on the upper west
side of Manhattan. John Lennon lived there when he was murdered in 1980, and his wife, Yoko Ono,
still makes it home.
182 The Bradbury Building was constructed in 1893 and is the oldest remaining building in central
Los Angeles. Its Victorian central atrium is a classic of late nineteenth century architecture.
183 The Stanley Hotel, located in Estes National Park in Colorado, opened in 1907. It is a grand,
beautiful building in an extremely scenic place.
184 Liana Hayles, 10 Movies With Iconic Architecture in a Starring Role, ARCHITIZER (May 22,
2014),
https://architizer.com/blog/inspiration/collections/10-movies-with-iconic-architecture-in-astarring-role/ [https://perma.cc/6TBM-F7BK].
185 See, e.g., Andrew Lasane, The Real-World Locations of Iconic Movie Homes, COMPLEX (Oct.
22,
2014),
https://www.complex.com/style/2014/10/the-real-world-locations-of-iconic-moviehomes/the-shining [https://perma.cc/24QM-LNQN]; Saundra Latham, 21 Famous Movie Houses That
Will Bring Back Memories, CHEAPISM (Feb. 8, 2019), https://blog.cheapism.com/famous-movie-
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movie makers access to their property or to the inside of their buildings,
that does nothing for the architects or other parties holding the copyright in
the building. Indeed, it only emphasizes the strangeness of the rule.
These outcomes create my angst over the differences in treatment of
publicly displayed pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, including
industrial designs with separable aspects, versus works of architecture. The
use of Cloud Gate as a significant part of the background setting of Batman
Forever would surely require payment of a royalty. Even though the exact
same statements in the House Report about works of architecture could be
made about famous outdoor sculptural works,186 no one could justifiably
claim that Anish Kapoor should be remediless under the statute. Or if the
work of REVOK used by H&M was painted on a famous building, rather
than a handball court wall, should there really be a major difference in the
way the graffiti and the building are treated? That is hard to rationalize.
The same dilemma, of course, played out in the Leicester litigation.
Because of fame generated by its appearance in Batman Forever, fans of
the film surely take random pictures of the Figueroa Street development
and Landscape Sculptor’s interior courtyard that everyone agreed was
separate from the architectural design of the office building itself.187 Should
the sculpture and the interior courtyard receive different treatment just
because one is deemed sculptural and the other architectural? That
conclusion too is very difficult to support.
What is the solution? The best result would be to handle the right to
exploit publicly displayed copyrighted sculpture, industrial designs, and
architecture under the same standard. In the cases discussed here, fair use
defenses would be raised. A central feature of that jurisprudence is the
strong tendency to deny fair use when the alleged infringing activity is
highly commercial in nature.188 In the examples raised in the House Report
supporting the enactment of 17 U.S.C. § 120(a), none were likely to have a
commercial impact except the making of posters. In the absence of that
houses/#image=1 [https://perma.cc/X3MT-N9UB]; Rudi Obias, 15 Real Movie Locations You Can
Actually Visit, MENTAL FLOSS (Nov. 4, 2015), http://mentalfloss.com/article/60109/15-real-movielocations-you-can-actually-visit [https://perma.cc/6VT9-BBXS]; Ely Razin, 8 Buildings That Played a
Starring
Role
in
Hollywood
Movies,
FORBES
(Apr.
28,
2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/elyrazin/2016/04/28/8-buildings-that-played-a-starring-role-inhollywood-movies/#3cd64705b3bd [https://perma.cc/944T-PPAL].
186 See H.R. REP. NO. 101–735 supra note 178.
187 Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 2000).
188 That’s been true for quite some time. The decision, for example, in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984) relied heavily on analysis of the economic
impact of the video tape recorder on the market for movies and television. Concluding that the time
delay feature of the then new technology had no significant impact on the market for the shows taped,
the Court refused to label the machine makers as secondary infringers. Id.
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section, the same examples would lead to the same conclusions about
picture taking of buildings. And many other occurrences in which images
of publicly visible sculpture, designs, or buildings might be made also
would probably be fair use. Quick scans of street scenes, museum galleries,
and industrial design convention halls provide only a small sampling of
uses likely to be deemed fair, even in audio visual works. On the other
hand, more intense use of images of sculptural works, industrial designs, or
works of architecture as backgrounds for movie settings would rely upon
the creative talents of others to make money—a use highly unlikely to be
protected as fair use. That is as it should be. Copyright law has long been
premised on the assumption that economic incentives to produce creative
works are a principal reason for enacting intellectual property protections.
And those incentives are traditionally deemed to include not only the right
to demand fees for the transfer of the work itself, but also for commercial
uses that others might wish to indulge in that make use of the original
work. That is exactly what was at stake in Leicester. Denying those owning
rights in either a sculptural or architectural work the right to receive such
payments is contrary to the basic spirit and purposes of copyright law.
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